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High Unemployment in Europe:
Diagnosis and Policy Implications
ABSTRACT
Econometric evidence suggests that the non—accelerating inflation rate of
unemployment (the NAIRU) has risen sharply in Europe in the past fifteen
years. In the first section of this paper, I review the recent proliferation
of supply-side models that say interesting things about why the NAIRU has
increased so substantially in Europe. In the second section of thepaper, I
employ a simple example to show how aggregate demand should optimally be
managed in response to transitory and permanent supply shocks, especially
those shocks that cause a persistent rise in the NAIRU. Also, I discusssome
policy implications of the increasingly popular "hysteresis hypothesis, that





carrbridge, NA 02138Unemployment continues to rise in Europe, as it has in almostevery year
since 1970. The unemployment rate is at double digit rates inBelgium, Italy,
Netherlands, and the U.K., and is quickly approaching the double digit level
in France. Very few countries in Europe (notably Austria, Sweden, and
Switzerland) have been able to avoid the scourge of high unemployment, and
even in those cases, unemployment has been avoided only through other costly
expedients. Remarkably, even though inflation seems well under control in
many high-unemployment countries (especially Germany and the Netherlands),
there continues to be great pessimism in the ability of theEuropean economies
to reverse the trend of swelling unemployment.
Of course, such pessimism may prove unfounded. Continuing low rates of
inflation in Germany are now provoking political pressures in thatcountry in
support of expansionary measures. Also, two favorable supply "shocks" are
looming on the horizon. A sharp decline in the price of oil, or a sharp
depreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to the European currencies, would
offer European policymakers significant scope for expansionary actions.Also,
real structural reforms in several countries have begun to lay thegroundwork
for sustained growth. Ironically, such reforms are most in evidence in
Socialist France, where Mitterand is now valiantly reversing the laxwage
policies of Giscard D'Estaing and of his own administration in its first two
years.
On the darker side, however, the reasons for caution in stimulating the
European economies are all too evident. Contrary to the optimism of someAmerican macroeconomists, such as Tobin (1984) and Gordon (1985), the
warning signs against rapid expansion still abound. Consider the case of the
United Kingdom for example, with the following recent pattern of inflation and
unemployment:
1983 1984 1985
Inflation (CPI) 4.6 5.0 5.1
Unemployment Rate 12.7 13.0 13.3
Source: CPI is taken from the International Financial Statistics; the
unemployment rate is the standardized OECD unemployment rate for the U.K.
CPI inflation for 1985 is the year—over—year inflation rate for August.
The unemployment rate for 1985 is the average for January to May.
The standard Keynesian, or demand-centered analysis, would argue that
unemployment rates in the range of 12 or 13 percent provide a prima facie case
for expansion, particularly since unemployment averaged a "mere 4.8 percent in
the period 1970-80. But such models would also predict that the extremely high
rates of the past three years should have caused a significant reduction in
inflation, something that they manifestly did not accomplish! Econometric
equations that I presented in 1983 (Sachs, 1983b) correctly suggested that even
at very high unemployment rates in the United Kingdom, little progress in infla-
tion could be expected in the absence of other policy reforms (which have not
been forthcoming).
The data from the U.K., and from most other countries in Europe, strongly
reject the key element of the demand-centered policy framework: the assumption
of a stable rate of unemployment above which demand expansion is—3-
non—inflationary. This threshhold rate, long christened the NAIRU (for
non—accelerating inflation rate of unemployment), has been anything but stable
in the past decade. The movements of actual unemployment rates relative to
historical averages, therefore, provide little direct evidence as to whether a
demand expansion is warranted or is likely to be inflationary. As voluminous
recent research has shown, the scope for demand expansion can be determined
only after a careful analysis of the supply conditions of the economy in
question.
I attempt two things in this paper. In the first section of thepaper,
I review the recent proliferation of supply-side models that say interesting
things about why the NAIRU has increased so substantially in Europe. In the
second section of the paper, I explore the design of aggregate demand
management policies in response to transitory and permanent supply shocks,
especially those shocks that cause a persistent rise in the NAIRU. Also, I
discuss some policy implications of the increasingly popular hypothesis that
the NAIRU itself is influenced by the time path of actual unemployment. Many
analysts have recently suggested that when economies are run at very slack
levels, the NAIRU itself is likely to rise. Unemployed workers lose the
skills required to reenter the job market; old factories are scrapped rather
than re—opened; new factories are not built. Eventually, it becomes difficult
to move down from the high unemployment levels because the opportunities for
re-absorbing the old job losers are no longer available. The high level of
slack becomes the new inflation threshhold.
If this "hysteresis't (i.e. path—dependency) effect is in fact powerful,
it would have subtle implications for demand management. Some have argued-4-
that such a possibility would provide a strong case of "going for growth",
since the NAIRU could be sharply lowered by several years of high employment
policies. The model below is not particularly supportive of this view,
however. With a high NAIRU, going for growth implies going for inflation,
even if the NAIRU will ultimately move down in response to strong demand
conditions. The model does suggest, on the other hand, that even one-time
blips in domestic inflation can cause permanent increases in the NAIRU and in
the actual unemployment rate, since optimizing policymakers will want to
absorb some of the inflation shock in the form of higher short-run
unemployment, which in turn will cause a persistent rise in the NAIRU.
I. The Rise in the NAIRU in Europe:
Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Explanations
The cornerstone of the analysis that follows is a Phillips curve equation
that links current inflation, ,tothe actual unemployment rate U, the
NAIRU, U*., and lagged or expected inflation itt_i:
(1)ir. =- (U-U)
+
Inwage-contracting models, and in most empirical inflation equations,
measures past inflation or built—in wage and price inertia. In rational
expectations models, should be interpreted as the (t-1)st period expecta-
tion of inflation in period t. From (1), ir., exceeds past inflation (or past
expectations of inflation) if and only if actual unemployment U.
is less than the NAIRU U. Assuming that demand management is feasible,
so that the policymakers can select the level of actual unemployment
Ut, inflation will tend to fall as long as Ut exceeds U, and inflation
will tend to rise in the opposite case. In rational expectations models in—5—
which systematic demand policies are ineffective in controlling
Ut,
the actual unemployment rate must necessarily equal the NAIRU in expectation,
since E(1r) = sothat E(Ut) =U.
Neither the standard Keynesian models nor the standard rational
expectations models have much to say about the determinants of U. In
Friedman's famous (1968) description of the natural rate of unemployment,U
is simply the level of unemployment that "would be ground out of the Wairasian
system of general equilibrium equations." In Keynesian models, U is taken as a
datum, as it has been in almost all rational expectations models. In both cases
the focus has been on the determinants of the gap of Ut andU arid rather than
on the level of U itself.
The neglect of U, or the association of U with frictional unemployment,
was a pragmatic choice in the 1960's and early 1970's when the NAIRU seemed to
be reasonably constant. However, since the early 1970's, policymakers and
economic theorists and econometricians have had to confront the overwhelming
evidence of a steep rise in U in most of the major economies of Europe. In
1979, Bruno and I argued that the scope for demand expansion in Europe was
very limited. In Sachs (1979) I suggested that the differing nature of wage
setting in the U.S. and Europe helped to explain why the U.S. had been able
to reduce unemployment after the first OPEC oil shock. More recently, Grubb,
Layard and Symons (1984) have put it this way:
The main reason unemployment is high is that governments fear the
effects on inflation if unemployment were lower. ..Thisis not of course
the same as saying that governments have chosen to produce the exact
levels of unemployment which we currently have. But governments do
constantly say they cannot reflate without abandoning their inflation
targets. We pass no judgement on whether their inflation targets are
right, but we do offer support for the view that it would be impossible
to ref late without a worse inflation performance (unless one had more
effective incomes policies). (p.57)-6-
A great deal of recent econometric work backs up this conclusion. Grubb,
Jackman, and Layard (1982,1983) have made estimates of the changes in the
NAIRU for several countries; Layard, Basevi, et. al. (1984) update these
results; Coe and Gagliardi (1985) at the OECD have also offered estimates
through 1983. The results uniformally show a rise over time in the rate of
unemployment consistent with steady inflation. For the EC countries as a
group, Layard, Basevi, et. al. have found the following:





Source: Layard, Basevi, et. al. (1984), p.18
The data are interesting for two reasons. First, of course, is the sharp
upward trend in the NAIRU. According to these estimates, of the 6.4 (8.8-2.4)
percentage point rise in average unemployment from 1966-70 to 1981-83, fully
5.0 (7.6 —2.6)percentage points are attributable to a rise in the natural
rate, and only 1.4 percentage points are therefore attributable to an
increasing gap of U. and U. Cumulatively, unemployment is wholly
attributable to the NAIRU, in the sense that the cumulative sums of actual and
NAIRU unemployment rates are both 19.8 percentage points over the period
1966-83. On average, actual unemployment has equalled the inflation-threshhold—7—
unemployment. The excess of recent unemployment above the NAIRU is merely
serving to reduce the inflation built into the EC economies during the episode
of 1971-75 when actual unemployment was far below the NAIRU.
There are two interpretations as to why the actual and the NAIRU rates
have moved rather closely together. Most obviously, policymakers havekept
actual Ut near to the rising U in order to keep inflation from risingeven
more than it did in the 1970s. Alternatively, the causality could be in the
reverse direction, with the sharp increases in actual unemployment raising the
NAIRU, as the hysteresis hypothesis suggests. Causality is difficult to
establish; it is reasonable to believe that both effects have played a role.
Individual country estimates show a rather similar pattern. The
estimates of Coe and Gagliardi, and of Layard, Basevi, et al., are reproduced
in Table 1.In Germany, France, the U.K. and the Netherlands, there is
evidence in both studies of sizable upward shifts in the NAIRU, and of close
movements through time of the actual unemployment rates and the NAIRU rates.
Interestingly, there is little apparent rise in the NAIRU in the U.S., Italy,
and Austria.
In view of the traditional link of U with "frictional" unemployment,
it might seem fruitful to try to explain the rise inU with variables that
can shift the frictional rate. Such candidates include: (1) a demographic
shift in the labor force, such a rising proportion ofyoung workers, who have
high rates of unemployment even when the aggregate unemployment rate is low;
or (2) job mismatch, as evidenced by an outward shift in the Beveridge curve,
that links vacancies and unemployment rates. A large number of studies have























































(1) NAIRU estimates given in Column (1) are
as column (a2) in Coe and Gagliardi.
those shown
(2) For the United States the source is Braun (1984),
"Productivity and the NAIRU (and other Phillips Curve
Issues)," Working Paper No. 34, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System. For the other countries









1966—1970 5.5 7.5 7.8
1971—1975 5.8 5.4 6.6
1976—1980 7.1 5.2 6.5
1981-1983 9.1 5.4 7.5
1969—1973 1.4 1.1
1974—1979 1.8 1.4 NA
1980-1983 3.0 2.4
1969—1973 2.5 3.0
1974—1979 5.2 4.5 NA
1980-1983 9.3 8.7
1961-1963 4.7 59
1967—1969 3.6 5.4 5.9
1970-1981 5.4 5.4 5.8
1974—1981 6.9 6.5 7.1
1982-1983 9.7 6.1 6.8-8-
on the whole. Simple tests by Layard, Basevi, et al. actually showed a
declining trend of mismatch (by occupation, by region, and by both together)
in the U.K., and no strong trends in the rest of Europe. Several recent
country studies presented at an L.S.E. Conference on the Rise in Unemployment
(May, 1985), concurred in that negative finding. On the whole, the European
economies adapted well to structural and occupational change in the 1960s, and
there is no strong evidence that the pace of change has accelerated in the
1970s.
A second obvious culprit is a change the unemployment benefits system in
the direction of greater subsidization of unemployment and job search. Here
too, the evidence is not strongly supportive. To summarize a complex record
across countries, there is indeed evidence that unemployment systems are
extremely generous in many countries, with benefits replacing a high fraction
of net—of-tax earnings of job losers, and with the benefits lasting for
several years. However, in most countries there has not been a notable rise
in the benefits ratio since the early 1970's, so that the change in NAIRU can
not be easily correlated with a change in the benefits system. Moreover, in
the case of the U.K., extensive cross-sectional work has been undertaken to
measure the responsiveness of unemployment durations, and hence aggregate
unemployment rates, to changes in the benefits ratio. While such
responsiveness is clearly evident, the magnitudes seem to be too small to
account for much of the U.K.'s large rise in the NAIRU.
The inability of standard frictional variables to account for much of the
increase in the NAIRU in Europe has led to a significant re-thinking of the
macroeconomic model in the European context. The frictional variables all-9—
stress the traditional emphasis of labor economics and macroeconomics on the
"representative household" making labor supply decisions on the basis of a
labor-leisure tradeoff. However, only a small fraction of employment
relations in Europe involve labor contracts directly between an employer and
an individual. The labor-leisure choice is almost everywhere mediated through
trade unions or through labor-market regulations set by the government. The
crucial realization of the new literature is that even when workers want to
supply labor inelastically at whatever wage is available in the labor market,
the trade unions properly representing the interests of those workers will
not choose to offer labor -inelastically at the market-clearing wage. Rather,
optimizing unions may choose to respond to adverse shifts in labor demand by
protecting real wages at the expense of higher unemployment, even though each
-individual worker would desire to work at a lower wage. Corden has dubbed the
basic situation as household-involuntary, union-voluntary unemployment.
This new approach stresses the following three conditions in European
labor markets in the 1970s. First, a large number of factors conspired to
shift the labor demand schedule inward throughout the past decade. That is,
the amount of labor that firms would like to hire at any given real wage has
not been rising as rapidly as -in the 1950s and 1960s. Factors which have
shifted the labor demand schedule adversely include the oil price increases,
which may be likened to negative productivity shocks (see Bruno and Sachs,
1985, ch. 2, for the formal analogy); a sharp, and largely unexplained,
slowdown -in technical productivity growth; and a rise in indirect and labor
taxes, which drive a wedge between the labor costs to the firm and the
workers' real take-home pay. Second, the response of optimizing trade unions-10-
is to accept the adverse labor-demand shifts partly in the form of lower
employment, and only partly in the form of lower real wages. And third, the
responsiveness of the economy in absorbing unemployed workers (either the
union job losers, or non—union new entrants to the labor market) is extremely
slow, in part due to restrictive legislation that prevents active competition
of non—union firms with union firms. An example of such restrictions is the
German practice of "extension' of the union wage to cover all workers, whether
union or non—union, in a given sector. Under such conditions, it is virtually
impossible for new, non-union firms to provide jobs for the unemployed.
We now turn to the theoretical models, and then to the empirical evidence
in their support.
A. Models of Union Wage Setting
A typical model of union wage setting is provided by MacDonald and Solow
(1981). Consider a monopoly union with N members, negotiating wages with a
competitive industry that produces outputusing capital K and labor input L,
(with LN). The production function of the sector is given as Q =AF(K,L)
with K fixed in the short run. The variable A is a productivity shift
variable, which can represent pure technical change, or changes in real prices
of other inputs, such as oil. The union is assumed to set the wage W, at which
level the firm may freely hire its desired input of workers. Short-run profit
maximization requires that W be equated with PAFL(K,L). As is well known,
this relation yields a local log-linear approximation of the form:
(2) 1 =— (w—p-a)+k
where=aa/(1-a)—11—
where a=log(A), l=log(L), w=log(W), etc. Here, a is the share of labor in
value added at the point of linearization, and a is the (local) elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor. If the underlying production relation
is Cobb—Douglas, then equation (2) holds at all points, with cr=1 and with a
equal to a constant share of labor in total value added.
Using equation (2) we can determine the level of real wages (w -p)that
is consistent with full employment in the sector. Denote this level as
Inverting (2) we find that w equals (k - + a.The percentage deviation
of the actual real wage from the full-employment real wage is termed the"wage
gap" in the literature. Later, I will discuss empirical estimates of thewage
gap for several countries in Europe.
Now suppose that the union selects a wage W in order to maximize the
expected utility of a representative worker, calculated as follows. Suppose,
for simplicity, that employment is distributed randomlyamong the union
members, with each having the probability L/N of receiving employment, and
(N-L)/N of not receiving employment. If the worker is employed, the utility
of the labor income is given by U(W/P). If the worker does not receivea job
-in the sector, it is assumed that his utility is given by a valueU0 which
reflects the combination of real unemployment benefits, the realwage levels
in other sectors where jobs might be available, leisure time, searchcosts,
etc. Evidently, the representative member's expected utility is:
(3) EU =(L/N)U(W/P) +[(N—L)/N]U0
By the institutional assumption that the union selects the wage while the firm
then selects the level of employment based on (2), MacDonald and Solow state—12—
the union's problem as maximizing EU subject to (2). At the optimum, of
course, d [E(U)]/d W =0,which upon straightforward differentiation yields




In the case that the utility function is logarithmic, condition (4) reduces
simply to:
(4') U -U0
=1/ or W/P =exp[U0+1/a]
Like a good monopolist, the union sets the wage as a markup over U0, with the
markup depending on the elasticity of labor demand, .Ahigh elasticity
leads to a low W/P, a low elasticity leads to a high W/P.
The interesting question for European unemployment is how such a union is
likely to respond to adverse labor demand shocks, proxied here by a downward
shifts in A or K. In general, one can trace out the response of W/P to shifts
in these variables, and calculate a wage-offer function, of the form W/P =
W/P(A,K). By substituting this wage offer function into the labor demand
equation, we can also calculate the implied labor supply of the union as a
function of A and K. Denote this function as LS =LS(A,K).Consider one
important special case first. Suppose that the elasticity of demand for
labor, ,isa constant (as in the Cobb-Douglas case, and nearly so f or CES
production functions with a close to 1.) Then, remarkably, the
first-order conditions in (4) can be solved for WIP independently of A and K.
In other words, the union will set a fixed real wage W/P no matter what the—13--
level of labor demand is at that wage level! All adverse shocks to labor
demand are absorbed through employment reductions, and not at all through real
wage cuts! This case is depicted in Figure la. More generally, the optimum
conditions induce a wage -employmentlocus that is upward or downward
sloping, so that adverse demand shifts affect both L and W/P, as is depicted
in Figure Lb.
Manyother authors have elaborated similar models. In some cases, the
union is assumed to care about the representative member's utility EU, but
also about the magnitude of total employment, so that the union maximizes a
function V =V(EU, L). Grossman (1984) and others have allowed for
seniority rules and internal union politics to affect probabilities that
particular members will or will not have jobs in the event of workforce
reductions. Still others have allowed for more complicated bargaining models,
in which the union does not unilaterally set W/P, but must extract awage
settlement based on bargaining power vis-a-vis the employers. In general,
such models all deliver the key result that adverse shocks should be absorbed
partially or fully by a decline in employment, and only partially (if at all),
by a real wage reduction.
In a recent paper, Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) use the same framework to
show that adverse shocks might plausibly be met by real wage increases rather
than decreases, so that the proportionate drop in employment can even exceed the
initial inward shift of the labor demand schedule! Their reasoning is as
follows. In a dynamic model, the firm's investment decisions will be a
function of the real wage levels that the union sets today and is anticipated
to set in the future. The factor price frontier suggests that the (log)w/P






quasi-rents to capital are a decreasing function of real wage and an
increasing function of the productivity shift variable, a: r =-b(w-p)+ya
(see Bruno and Sachs, ch. 2-3, for a thorough discussion of the factor price
frontier, and its implication for investment behavior). Most models of
firm-level investment link changes in K to the level of r relative to the cost
of capital. In general, a rise in (w -p)should be expected to reduce r and
thereby reduce investment. Lawrence and Lawrence point out, however, that in
very depressed sectors, for which r is already extremely low, firms may
already be in the position of making no gross investment. For such depressed
industries, the elasticity of response of investment to the wage will be zero.
Now consider the implications of these observations for optimal union
wage policy. To introduce investment but keep the model static, let us write
the size of the capital stock k as a function of r. Moreover, assume that the
capital stock is variable for r above a minimum r, but that for r below r, the
capital stock is fixed:




By subsituting (5) into (2), we see that the overall elasticity of employment
with respect to the real wage includes both the direct effect of wages on 2,
given k, and the indirect effect on k as well. The overall elasticity equals
+äbwhen r >r,and the overall elasticity equalsfor r <r.
Now to the punch line. Suppose that an adverse shock deals a sharp blow
to a sector that initially has r >r.With productivity declining, and wages
rigid, the firm enters the region in which investment is no longer profitable.
At that point, the elasticity of demand for labor falls from+öbto just ,—15—
since the capital stock becomes insensitive to the real wage level. But we
have already noted that the union's optimal wage demand depends inversly on
the elasticity of demand for labor. Once the adverse shock pushes the sector
into the region of no gross investment, the union should optimally respond by
raising the real wage! The simple point is that in a declining sector,
quasi-rents to capital become pure rents and therefore an attractive bundle of
resources to be grabbed by a union that no longer has to worry about
disincentives to future investment policy.
Lawrence and Lawrence apply this story to the U.S. steel sector, where a
decade of supply shocks and intense foreign competition has been met by
constantly increases in real wages that have outpaced almost every other
sector. Not surprisingly, steel industry employment has plummeted. As Solow
stated in his discussion of the Lawrence and Lawrence model, their
interpretation is an effective explanation of what must otherwise be written
off as a death—wish of the United Steel Workers union. Application of the
model to European industries has not yet been attempted, but my hunch is that
it will prove an effective vehicle of explanation.
The union wage model helps to explain a shift in employment in response
to adverse supply shocks. A small extension can transform it into a model of
the Phillips relationship in (1). Almost all authors have taken the position
that the union wage model describe the target level of employment of the
unions, LS, rather than the actual level of employment period to period.
Slippage between LS and actual L can come from lags in wage contracting,
mistakes in inflation expectations, the unwillingness of firms to turn away
customers at prices which are posted before the exact level of demand is-16-
known, etc. The union is therefore assumed to adopt an error-correction
mechanism in its wage setting, with real wages rising when actual employment
exceeds desired emp1oyment. Specifically, let L now represent total
employment (aggregated over all sectors), and N represent the total labor
force. Log(L/N) equals -U. Define Log(LS/N) as -U*. Now assume that
nominal wages are changed as a function of expected or lagged inflat-lon,
and the percentage gap of actual over desired employment,






From (2), we can write current price change, ir as a function of current
w
wage change, 'currentemployment change, and current changes in technical







expression into (6), we get a standard Phillips curve of the
form:






This equation differs from the one at the beginning of this section only by
allowing for productivity change to affect inflation (the qi term), and by
allowing changes in unemployment to affect ir. The crucial fact from our
point of view is that supply shocks which cause LS, and therefore U*, to
change, will cause shifts in the Phillips curve of the sort that have been
observed in the past decade.—17--
The models so far fill in a large part of the explanation of the rise in
the NAIRU in Europe. They reconcile two apparently contradictory notions: the
cross-sectional evidence that household labor supply (especially of prime—age
males) is fairly inelastic, so that households should in principle be willing
to accept real wage cuts in order to protect employment; and the macroeconomic
evidence that real wage reductions only occur slowly, if at all. However, a
more complete explanation must also consider why union workers who lose their
jobs, and non-union workers who can't get union jobs, are not absorbed in
non-union sectors. Various ideas are circulating as to how to close the model.
Minford (1983), for example, has argued that a competitive non-union sector in
fact exists and could absorb the unemployed, but that the ratio of unemployment
benefits to non-union wages are simply too high to make those job prospects
attractive. Nickell (1984) has disputed this interpretation, by arguing that
even with respect to non-union wages there has not been a significant increase
in the unemployment benefits ratio. Other authors, particularly in Germany,
have argued that the non-union sector is itself so hampered by regulation that
it cannot be a vigourous absorber of the unemployed. Two types of restrictions
are stressed. In the non-union parts of the industrial sectors, union wage
levels generally apply to the non-union firms. The employers confederations
that bargain with the unions find it in their interest to police the extension
of union wages to non-union firms. According to some analysts, non-union
firms that attempt to shirk, by paying below union scale, can find themselves
blacklisted by their suppliers, who do pay union wages. In the
non—industrial, service industries, various guild-type regulations allegedly
hamper the possibility of a rapid expansion. Finally, in France (until very-18—
recently) and some other countries, the pressure for general wage increases
came not only through unions, but also through an active public sector wages
policies, which acted to maintain an across-the-board increase in real incomes
for those individuals lucky enough to have jobs (in France, the minimumwage,
known as the SMIC, has been an important instrument of that wage policy).
B. Empirical Evidence on the Union-Wage Model
Testing of the union-wage framework has developed along three lines.
First, various investigators have examined the real wage-employment link in
(2), which is a crucial aspect of the model. Second, various studies have
examined wage determination, to see whether real wages decline sufficiently in
the face of supply disturbances, or whether, as in the model, realwages
remain high (above full employment levels) when supply shocks occur. Third,
direct econometric estimates of the Phillips curve have included supply-side
variables, to see whether the observed shifts in the Phillips curve can indeed
be linked up with variables that are identified as important in theunion-wage
model.
(1) The Real Wage -UnemploymentLink
After decades of work on the cyclical behavior of realwages in the
United States, a consensus had emerged in the early 1970s thatcontrary to the
implications of neoclassical labor demand equations, high unemployment is
associated with low rather than high real wages. It has turned out, however,
that those results were specific to the U.S. A great deal of recent work,
with carefully specified labor demand functions, has found that realwages are
a significant determinant of labor demand, at least in the manufacturing—19—
sector, for which most of the analysis has been made.
Examples of such findings are Bruno and Sachs (1985), Ch. 8, where itis
shown that in 8 of the 9 OECO economies that we examined (all countries tested
except the U.S.), the real product wage in manufacturing has a strong and
significant negative effect on manhours in the manufacturing sector. The
average elasticity of demand for manhours with respect to the real wage in the
short run is estimated to be about -0.50, and to be about —1.0 to —1.5 in the
long term. Several other recent studies have also estimated neoclassical labor
demand schedules, again with successful results. Symons and Layard (1984),
Grubb, Layard and Symons (1984), and Newell and Symons (1985) have made
careful cross-country comparisons of the labor demand equation. In the Newell
and Symons study of 16 OECD economies, the real wage is negatively signed 13
of 16 times, with an average t-statistic of 1.7. On average, the estimated
long—run elasticity of labor demand is found to be about -0.9, slightly lower
in absolute value than in Bruno and Sachs.Several recent studies for the
U.K. all find a highly significant real wage effects. Such studies include
Nickell and Andrews (1983), Symons (1985), Beenstock, Warburton, Lewington,
and Macromatis (1983) and Layard and Nickell (1984). All of these studies
find a statistically significant long-run real wage elasticity of employment
in the neighborhood of -1.0. Unfortunately, similarly detailed studies have
not yet been carried out for most of the other European economies.
The fact that high product wages (or at least product wages that are high
relative to a slowing trend of productivity) can track the decline in labor
inputs in the OECD economies in the 1970s is consistent with (indeed, nearly
the same as) the finding in a large number of studies of a continuing real-20-
wage gap in the European economies. Remember from the earlier discussion that
the real wage gap attempts to measure the deviation of actual real wages from
the level of real wages that would be consistent with labor demand equalling
full-employment labor supply. Essentially, the comparison is between the
actual level of real wages and the level of the marginal product of labor when
measured at full—employment levels. Bruno and Sachs (1985, Ch. 9) offer
several measures of wage gaps, and a detailed discussion of the difficulties
in calculating the wage gap. Some wage gap measures based on the procedures
in Bruno and Sachs (1985) are shown in Table 2. They suggest that the wage gap
remains high in most European economies.
A more powerful procedure is to estimate the relevant production
functions from which the labor demand equation can be derived. Knowledge of
the production function permits a direct estimation of the marginal product of
labor at any given level of employment. Artus (1984) provides the single
study to date that applies this ambitious methodology. His findings offer
strong support to the view that real wages continue to be above market
clearing levels in the major European economies. Indeed the magnitudes of the
estimated gaps are very close to those found by Bruno and Sachs.
One area of controversy in this literature is whether demand variables in
addition to supply variables show up in the labor demand equation. In other
words, controlling for real wages, the capital stock, and the real prices of
other variable inputs, is labor demand also a function of the state of
aggregate demand? The Keynesian approach would predict yes (indeed, it often
ignores the role of the supply variables), while a thoroughgoing neoclassical
approach would predict no. Unfortunately the evidence is split. In SachsTable 2. Adjusted Wage Gaps, 12 OECD Countries, 1965-1983
(1964-69 0.0)
1965 1970 1973 1976 1979 1981 1982 1983
U.S. 0.2 0.1 6.0 2.9 6.8 8.1 8.6 8.4
Canada —1.9 1.9 —0.5 3.3 0.8 2.2 2.9 3.5
Europe
UK. -2.0 2.2 4.6 11.0 16.4 24.1 25.0 26.4
Belgium 2.1 —0.8 13.6 30.2 37.2 40.7 35.2 -
Denmark —2.3 2.5 8.1 13.0 17.6 16.4 13.7 9.2
France 0.0 —3.4 -0.4 7.9 10.7 14.3 17.4 -
Germany 2.0 1.5 7.2 13.0 15.3 19.1 15.9 12.9
Italy 2.3 6.4 15.4 19.5 11.8 9.1 7.6 5.9
Norway —2.5 —4.3 —1.3 13.9 17.3 7.7 6.4 6.2
Sweden 2.7 —1.1 —5.2 3.7 —1.6 —4.0 —7.1 —9.6
Source: Bruno (1985). Note that Ido not report the results for the
Netherlandsbecause of a severe data problem regarding the
value added deflator used by Bruno in his original calculations.—21—
(1983a), Bruno and Sachs (1985), and Bruno (1985), we have found that monetary
variables, and occassionally fiscal variables, can help to explain labor demand
in addition to the supply variables. Similar results have been found by
Grubb, Layard, and Symons (1984), and by Layard and Nickell (1984). On the
other hand, Newell and Symons (1985) have been unable to find a significant
added role for demand variables, except in France and the United States. It
is not easy at this point to account for these discrepancies.
(b) Real Wage Determination
The second leg of the union-wage model is the presumption that adverse
supply shocks get absorbed in lower employment as well as in reductions in the
real wage. Most of the econometric studies have examined short-run wage
behavior in response to various supply shocks; a few, particularly Newell and
Symon (1985), address the difficult econometric issue of whether the failure of
downward real wage adjustment is a short-run phenomenon or a long-run
phenomenon. This question is important, for it determines whether a one—time
shift in labor demand (say a rise in oil prices) is likely to cause a transitory
rise in unemployment, or a permanent increase in the NAIRU.
Supply shocks may be defined broadly as anything which shifts the demand
for labor in equation (2). Here we must be particularly careful about the
definitions of W and P. Presumably worker utility in (1) depends upon
net-of-tax nominal wages, deflated by a consumer price index, or W(1_t)/Pc
Labor demand in (2) depends on the nominal wage inclusive of labor taxes (e.g.
payroll taxes for social security), deflated by the value added deflator, or
W(1+T)/P. Anything which alters the ratio of the real consumption wage to—22—
the real employer costs is like a supply shock, in that it shifts a properly
specified labor demand schedule in (2). Many authors have christened the
ratio of these two measures as "the wedge", the log of which can be
approximated as:
(8) log(wedge) =T+t + -
Insum, the relevant supply shocks to examine are: increases in payroll taxes
(T), increases -in employee labor taxes t, relative price shocks (such as the
OPEC shocks) which affect cv' shifts in technical change (the parameter a
in (2)), and shifts in the capital stock. In principal, any adverse change in
these measures must be balanced, at full employment, by a reduction in the
real take-home consumption wage. A rise in the wedge, for example, requires
an equiproport-ional drop in real take-home pay.
Almost all studies confirm that downward real wage adjustments -in most
economies are not rapid enough to prevent a rise in the wage gap following an
adverse supply disturbance. What is less clear from the evidence is whether
the increase in the wage gap is a permanent response to a supply shock, or -is
rather a transient blip in real labor costs that -is reduced over time.
In the former case, the NAIRU can be expected to rise in the "long run" (i.e.
until the next shock occurs) while in the latter case, the increase in the
measured NAIRU will be reversed over time, even in the absence of new
disturbances. In any case, it appears that the relevant adjustments are very
slow. Note that the union wage model predicts a permanent rise in the NAIRU.
Empirically, the major supply shocks appear to be tax and productivity
changes, rather than the oil shocks on which I and many others have focussed.-23-
Knoester (1983) and Knoester and Van der Windt (1985) provide powerful
evidence that tax increases do not lead to the necessary reductions in
W(1-t)/P, as they must in order to stay at full employment, but rather get
shifted forward onto capital (and thus unto employment). Knoester and Van der
Windt examine real consumption wage growth in ten OECD economies, and in every
case, a rise in labor taxes leads to an increase in pre-tax real wage growth.
The implication -is that a rise in either t or -r causes an increase in the
employer's real labor costs W(1+T)/Pv, as predicted in the union-wage model.
In their study of wage setting in the U.K., Layard and Nickell similarly find
that labor tax increases are absorbed largely by the firm, rather than by
reductions in the workers net-of-tax take home pay. Indeed, their equations
allow them to measure the unemployment effects of tax increases in various
periods. They find (Table 9, p.74) that increases in taxes (including
employer and employee labor taxes, income taxes, and indirect taxes)
contributed 1.2 percentage points to the rise in unemployment in 1967-74
relative to 1956-66; 1.3 percentage points to a further rise during 1975—79;
and 0.9 percentage points more during 1980-83. Over the sixteen years
1967-83, therefore, the total increase in unemployment due to tax increases is
estimated to be 3.4 percentage points.
Interestingly, many authors have found that the rapid wage increases in
the early 1970's are hard to explain even after accounting for increased
taxes, productivity growth, etc. Perry (1975), Gordon (1977), Sachs (1979),
and more recently Layard and Nickell (1984), Bruno and Sachs (1985), and
Newell and Symons (1985) have all stressed the empirical importance and
essential puzzle of the wage explosion during 1968-73. Layard and N-ickell-24-
allow for a change in union "strength", measured by a change in the union to
non-union markup, to enter the aggregate wage equation. This variable helps
to account for the real wage boom of the early 1970's. The union effect is
calculated to account for about 1.2 percentage points in the overall rise in
unemployment. Newell and Symons find an even more important role for a
niilitancy dummy variable in their equations for 16 OECD economies. Indeed,
for the E.C. as a whole, they attribute approximately one half of the 3.7
percent increase in unemployment during 1977—81 relative to 1963—67 to their
wage-explosion variable, and relatively little to the tax and other wedge
variables.
(c) Reduced—form Estimates of the Phillips Curve
We have already discussed in the Introduction several studies which have
shown a significant rise in the estimated NAIRU in the European economies.
Some studies, such as Grubb, Jackman, and Layard (1983) and Bruno and Sachs
(1985), have combined the labor demand and wage equations to come up with
reduced form Phillips curve equations in which the supply variables are
allowed to enter freely. In one set of estimates in Bruno and Sachs (Tables
10.2 and 10.3), the wage gap is entered as a shift variable in the
Phillips curve equation, as a proxy for shifts in U*. The estimated equation








where is consumer price -inflation,isannual productivity change,
and ir -is import price inflation. The results for the European economies in
the sample are shown in Table 3, below. The first column shows the estimated
coefficient on w, the second shows the measured wage gap as of 1981, and theTable 3. The Wage Gap and the Phillips Curve
Increase in U
Estimated in Needed to
Country Value of a2 1981 Counteract
Belgium 104a 29.3 5.3
(3.5)
Denmark 19.0 7.0 3.7
(1.6)
France 10.9 1.9 -0.3
(0.9)
Germany 42.1 12.2 4.3
(7.9)
United Kingdom 71.3 19.3 9.6
(3.9)
aNumbers in parentheses are t-statistics
Source: Column 3 is calculated as -a2w9/a5,using the estimates from
Bruno and Sachs (1985), Table 10.2. All other data are from
Tables 10.2 and 10.3.—25—
third column shows how much the unemployment rate would have to rise in order to
eliminate the inflationary effects of the wage gap, using the coefficients
estimated in (9). Note that all of the countries except France demonstrate a
marked shift in the Phillips curve associated with the rise in the wage gap.
For France, we suspect, measurement problems plagued our estimates of the wage
gap.
A different approach -is attempted in Sachs and Wyplosz (1985), where
shifts in the French NAIRU are studied. The "wedge" and productivity shift
variables are put directly in the Phillips curve, as determinants of shifts in
U*. A provisional estimate of a modified Phillips curve for France is as
follows (the numbers in parentheses are t-statist-ics):
(10) = — 4.66








The regression is a standard Phillips curve, except for the inclusion of a
NAIRU shift variable, which is given as the log of trend labor productivity
minus the log of the wedge (I explain this variable in a moment). Otherwise,
current inflation ir. is written as a function of lagged inflation, the
level and change in U, import price inflation ir_1 relative to domestic price
inflation (i.e. relative import price shocks), and a time trend. The
(log) productivity variable is measured as a +(k—)/,which we saw from
equation (2) gives the "warranted" product wage (i.e., the product wage
consistent with full employment) based on underlying labor productivity. When-26-
we calculate a +(k-9)/13
—log(wedge),we have a measure of the warranted
real take-home pay as a function of technology, taxes and shifts in relative
input prices.
The estimated NAIRU is found by solving for Ut in (10) assuming
= = 7T_,and U = Thus,
u1 -3.18time 49.79 {log(productivity) -log(wedge)] (10 ) — 4.66 —4.66
Since the time trend increases by 1 each year, the equation suggests that
productivity net of the wedge (i.e. the warranted take—home pay) must grow by
(3.18/49.79) =0.064,or 6.4 percent per year, in order for the NAIRU to
remain constant. The post—'73 rise of the wedge in France and an accompanying
slowdown in productivity growth have both reduced the growth of the warranted
wage well below 6.4 percent per year. Accordingly, the NAIRU has risen
sharply since 1973, by about 5 percentage points, to a rate of about 8 percent
(alternative regression estimates put the range at 7.5 to 9 percent). The
increase during the period 1963-72 was only about 1 percentage point, both
because underlying productivity growth was faster and the wedge increased at a
much slower pace. For further details, see Sachs and Wyplosz (1985).
II. Demand Management Policies and the Shifting NAIRU
Supply shocks that deliver increases in the NAIRU are naturally best
handled by supply-side measures. Incomes policies, social contracts between
governments and unions, supply-side tax cuts, etc. are possible devices for
handling such disturbances.Having noted that, however, it is still—27—
important to focus attention on the appropriate role for demand management
policies, particularly in the case that supply-side measures are politically
or institutionally difficult to implement (see Caimfors (1984) for a very
innovative and largely successful attempt to show how political organization
and union organization in the Northern European economies can shape the scope
for supply-side measures). The question of demand management becomes even
trickier in the case that actual demand management policies can affect the
evolution of the NAIRU, according to the "hysteresis" hypothesis, to which I
now turn. The decade-long bout with high and rising unemployment in Europe
has provoked enormous frustration, and urgings from some analysts for a
significant reflation (see, for example, Layard, Basevi et al. (1984), and
Blanchardi.(1985);see also the discussion by Gordon (1985) in his paper
for this conference). One argument for expansion is that the current levels
of unemployment clearly exceed the current NAIRU, and that on the margin,
employment gains are more important than further gains against inflation. A
second and increasingly popular argument is that even if the NAIRU is high,
demand expansion is justified on the grounds that continued slack would itself
contribute to yet further increases in the NAIRU. The argument, as broached
in the Introduction, holds that the NAIRU depends not just on supply factors
such as the "wedge", but also on the actual levels of unemployment in the
economy.
Blanchard et al. (1985) offer two interesting empirical arguments in
support of this proposition. Hargraves Heap (1980) offers several more
theoretical arguments. The simplest argument is that the NAIRU depends on the
capital stock (remember from Section I that a decline in K is like a supply-28-
shock), and that the evolution of the capital stock depends not just on factor
prices but also on the state of demand in the economy. Hence, by running the
economy at unemployment rates below the NAIRU, new investment is spurred,
which will eventually reduce the NAIRU. The empirical basis of this case is
outlined in Blanchard et al. The second empirical argument is that the NAIRU
drifts up over time when U >U*because the long—term unemployed eventually
become unemployable. Once this occurs, they stop contributing to the downward
pressure on inflation. An extremely interesting regression analysis shows
that only the unemployment rate for the short-term unemployed (those
unemployed less than six months) contributes significantly to the Phillips
curve equation. As the authors put it: "Many of the long-term unemployed in
total unemployment have in effect ceased looking for work and, as a result,
may be inefficient draftees in the fight against high real wages and
inflation." (p.30) This same effect has led Newell and Symons (1985) to enter
U in their Phillips curve equation as Ut_O.5Ut_2 under theassumption that the
current NAIRU is raised by O.5Ut_2.
Given the plausibility and popularity of the hysteresis argument, it is
unfortunate that the policy implications of hysteresis have not yet been
worked out. Does the existence of hysteresis mean that the economy should be
run at very low unemployment rates, so that the NAIRU is reduced to very low
levels? Does it mean that supply shocks should not be fought with
unemployment, because that merely contributes to longer-term structural
problems? The answers are not yet known.
I now offer a brief, and simple, analysis of this issue, to see whether
hysteresis provides a strong case for a European expansion in the absence of—29-
independent improvements in the NAIRU (everybody is for expansion if
demand-expanding measures can be combined with wage restraint, or other supply
expanding policies!) To model this case, I assume that changes in the NAIRU





A similar formulation of the hysteresis hypothesis -isfoundin Hargraves Heap
(1981). The standard case, without hysteresis is given by f =0.We will
study that special case along with the case in which f >0.
The rest of the model will rely on a standard Phillips curve approach,
stated in continuous time. Letting 7r be the instantaneous inflation rate,




It is assumed that the Phillips curve in (12) represents the partial
adjustment mechanism outlined earlier. Also because of the implied lags in
nominal wage change in responding to price changes, it is assumed that
policy-makers can influence the level of unemployment at each instant, through
standard demand management tools.
Policymakers are assumed to minimize an intertemporal social loss
function, of the form:
r—öt
(13) V0 = ev(7r,U)dt
v(1r,U) is the instantanous level of social loss (negative welfare). Of
course the loss v is increasing in both arguments. Moreover, I assume that—30—
the function is convex, so that the marginal costs of inflation or
unemployment rise as the levels of inflation or unemployment increase, 6 is
the pure rate of social time discount, and intertemporal social loss is the
disounted integral of the instantaneous loss levels. As a specific, and
easily tractable example, I assume now that instantaneous social loss is








target level is below U.
The policy problem is given as:
(14) max V0 with respect to the time path of U, subject to
(11) and (12)
Technically, the problem requires a straightforward application of optimal
control techniques. There is no issue of time inconsistency of the optimal
plan in this case because the agents in the private sector are not modelled as
forward looking. To solve the problem, we simply set up the Hamiltonian H,
and take first-order conditions (hereafter, time subscripts will be dropped
when not necessary). A and y are the costate variables associated with the
Phillips curve equation and hysteresis equation, respectively.
defined as a zero level of inflation and unemployment.
point should allow for a positive frictional level of
context however, all that is important is that the bliss
is below the initial level of the NAIRU; introduction of
for U would not change any results as long as that—31—
(15) H =et[U2/2+air2/2-A4(U-U*)+)'f(U—U*)]
(a) aiau =0=>U=A1-
(b)3H/air =-d/dt[etA]=>air = ox-
(c)ai-i/au* =-d/dt[e5ty]=>A4 - yf = O-y -
(d)=-4(U-U*)
(e) O*= f(U-U*)
In order to best understand the implications of these first-order conditions,
it is useful to begin with the standard policy case -in which f =0.
A. Optimal policy in the absence of hysteresis
Once f is set equal to zero, we can ignore '(yis the costate variable
associated with U*, which is now considered fixed). The first order




By differentiating the equation linking U to A, and substituting -inthe
equation for A, and combining the results with the Phillips curve equation in
(12), we can write the system in U and iT,inthe following way:
[Olr oa[Ui [0
(16) (=
I I I I+
I
LirJ[- °jLJ L u*
A graphical analysis of this system is shown in Figure 2. Note that the phase
arrows indicate the saddlepoint stability of the system, a standard feature of









lie on the saddlepoint stable manifold shown by the dotted line.
In the steady-state, at point A, the actual unemployment rate equals the
NAIRU, U* (assumed constant), and inflation is positive, at the rate it =
8U*/q,a.It is interesting that the optimizing policymaker should choose to
remain fixed at U* and positive inflation in the long run, even though a
better steady state point (U* and zero inflation) is clearly available. The
reason that the economy converges to a positive inflation rate is that were
the economy to be at U =U*and it =0it would be advantageous to have a
temporary expansion at the cost of a higher permanent inflation! Why?
Because at U=U* and it =0,the instanteous marginal costs of higher inflation
are zero and the instantaneous marginal benefits of reduced inflation are
positive (this is because inflation is at the bliss point, while unemployment
is not). As long as the time discount rate is positive, it always pays to
undertake at least some expansion relative to the zero-inflation equilibrium.
The result is positive steady-state inflation. Note that the steady state
inflation rate is higher the lower is the weight on inflation in the welfare
function (a), and the higher is the rate of social time discount (6).
Using the system in Figure 2 we can investigate the consequences of two
types of disturbances. First, in Figure 3a consider the implications of a
blip in the inflation rate at t =0,due to some factor (e.g. a temporary oil
price shock) that does not raise the long-run NAIRU. In that case, the
initial inflation rate moves from the level at point A to the level at point
B. The system must adjust along the saddlepoint path, so that unemployment
(which is the policy variable), also jumps up at time 0, to the level shown at
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saddlepoint path) to the long—run equilibrium at A. Thus, a one-time price
shock that does not raise U leads to a stagflationary period in which
inflation temporarily exceeds its long-run level and unemployment is
temporarily greater than U*.
Perhaps more interesting is the case in Figure 3b. Assume now that the
inflation shock also raises the NAIRU, along the lines of the union-wage
model. Then, the new long-term equilibrium shifts to a point like C.
Importantly, the rise in the NAIRU leads to a higher long—run inflation rate
as well as a higher long-run unemployment rate, even with optimal
policymaking. When U* rises, the gap between the optimum and the equilibrium
unemployment rate increases. Policymakers are no longer willing to stop
expanding at the previous steady-state inflation rate, since at that point,
the marginal discounted benefits of a temporary expansion exceed the marginal
costs. This model therefore provides a positive analysis as to why the rise
in the NAIRU in Europe was also associated with a significant rise in
inflation over the past decade. The answer is not simply bad demand management.
Rather, with the NAIRU so high, it has paid for policy makers to try to
eke out even a temporary demand expansion for the purposes of keeping U
temporarily below U*.
In summary, in the absence of hysteresis, a temporary price shock leads
to a temporary stagflationary episode, with prices and unemployment eventually
returning to their initial level. A price shock that also raises the NAIRU
leads to a stagflationary episode in which both unemployment and inflation
remain higher in the steady state.—34-
B. Optimal Policy in the Presence of Hysteresis
Now we return to the major theme of this section: the effects of
hysteresis on the optimal policy path of U. Returning to the first—order
conditions in (15), differentiate (15)(a), and substitute (15)(b) and (15)(c),
and then use (15)(d) and (15)(e), to get the following three dimensional




Once again this system is saddlepoint stable, as may be checked by the fact
that there is exactly one positive eigenvalue in the transition matrix in
(17).2 There is also one negative eigenvalue and one eigenvalueequal to zero.
The zero root means technically that the system will display hysteresis,so
that U, U*, and iTwillnot have the tendency to return to an initial steady
state even after a transitory perturbation.
To analyze this system I adopt a method suggested first by Dixit (1980).
c12, c13) be the normalized left eigenvalue associated
(unstable) real root in (17). Letr1 denote that positive
by assumption). Then, it is easy to prove that the actual
along the optimal path must equal:
(18) U -c12ir -c13U*
To find the specific values forc12 and c13, note that the left eigenvector
must satisfy the following equation:
Let the vector (1
with the positive






Therefore, we can easily find that c12 =-(a/r1), andthat c13 =
Substitutinginto (18), we come up with the equation for optimal unemployment
policy along the adjustment path. Note that c12, c13 <0.
To see the implications of this optimal policy, substitute (18) back into
(17), to find a two-dimensional system in U* and ir.This system is as
follows
[ill r4c12 q(1+c13)
(20)1.1 =I 'I I
[u*J L_fci2 —f(li-c13)j[
U*
Note that given the equation for r1, it is possible to prove thatc13 >— i.3
Also, C12< 0and c13 <0.
The system in (20) is shown graphically in Figure 4. The loci for O* =0
and it =0are the same, as can be verified by direct inspection of (20). The
fact that the loci are identical is the implication of having a zero
eigenvalue in the original autonomous system. With only one locus defining
the equilibrium for both U* and ir, it is easy to see that any point on the
locus is a stationary point! In this sense, unemployment and inflation will
be path dependent. The stationary positions of U* and ir, and in fact of U
since U=U* in the steady state, are determined by the specific path along
which the economy arrives on the stable locus.
Consider, for example, the one-time inflation shock that we analyzed in
Figure 3a. Starting from an equilibrium point A in Figure 5a, the economy















(20), the inflation shock prompts a jump in the unemployment rate. According
to the hysteresis assumption, U* begins to rise. The system follows thephase
arrows from point B, and arrives at the stable locus at point C. The result
is striking: in the present of hysteresis and optimal demandmanagement, a
one-time jump in the inflation rate leads to a permanent rise in U*, U andit.
Evenwith optimal policy, the result is a long-run increase -in both inflation
and unemployment!
In Figure 5b we analyze the case in which the supply shock raises bothit
andU* on impact. The conclusion is the same, only more so. Again, the shock
leads to a permanent increase in unemployment and inflation.
We are now in a position to answer the questions at thebeginning of this
section. The existence of hysteresis does not necessarily mean thatan
economy with high inflation and unemployment should necessarily expand. If at
the initial condition the inflation rate is high and theunemployment rate is
moderate, as in point B in Figure 6, then the optimal path involvesrising
unemployment and falling inflation. If, on the other hand the initial
position is one of low inflation and high U*, as in point C, then an expansion
is warranted. Given the inflationary costs of expansion when the initial
NAIRU is high, there is no general case for an expansion in thepresence of
hysteresis. With respect to policy responses to 5'Ji thcck, it is clear
from the analysis of Figure 5 that unemployment indeed shouldbe used in
response to an inflationary shock (of course, if supply-side measures are
available they should be used instead), even though the result of the
temporary rise in U is a permanent rise in U.Figure 6. Conditions for Danand Expansion or Contraction in








High unemployment is the major policy problem confronting the
macroeconomic authorities in Europe. The major reason that policymakers in
Europe eschew demand expansion in the face of such high unemployment rates is
not the belief that a policy expansion would be ineffective in reducing the
unemployment rate, but rather the fear that an expansion would rekindle
inflation. In the context of standard demand-side models, such fears look
foolish. On the other hand, a great deal of recent theoretical and empirical
work has shown that the non-inflationary threshold unemployment rate (i.e. the
NAIRU) has been rising steadily since the early 1970's. The policymakers are
right about demand management: even at today's high unemployment rates, a
demand expansion could well re-ignite inflation in many countries. A
country-by--country analysis of aggregate supply conditions is necessary in
order to determine the scope for a demand expansion.
The theoretical work described in this paper helps us to understand the
some of the reasons that the NAIRU has increased. The major theoretical
puzzle has always centered on the fact that on the household level, labor
supply seems to be fairly inelastic. Household labor market behavior suggests
that adverse supply shocks should be willingly absorbed by laborthrough the
mechanism of real wage reductions. However, on the aggregate level, realwage
reductions seem to be anything but smooth. The model of unionwage
determination in the paper emphasizes the point that when individuals (with
inelastic labor supplies) bargain for wages through a monopoly union, it is
possible, if not likely, that adverse supply shocks will be absorbed in the-38-
form of reductions in employment, rather than reductions in the real wage.
The union-wage models do not, of course, account for the failure of the
non-union sector to absorb smoothly the workers laid off from the union
sector. Various regulations may well block the adjustment of the non-union
sector. The failure of the non-union sector to grow strongly in most European
countries, in contrast to its rapid growth in the United States, should be a
prime area of future empirical research.
The empirical work reviewed here has demonstrated several important
points in addition to the major finding of a sharp increase in the NAIRU in
most European countries. First, the level of unemployment has been
importantly affected by movements of the real wage, as is stressed in the
union-wage model. This finding is established both in econometric labor
demand equations and in estimates of the wage gap. Second, wage setters
adjust the real wage only partially, if at all, in response to various supply
disturbances, with the implication that the real product wage facing firms is
likely to increase when labor taxes or oil prices increase. In this sense,
the econometric wage equations confirm that adverse supply shocks tend to open
up wage gaps. Third, econometric Phillips curve equations tend to confirm the
fact that supply shock variables are in part or in whole responsible for the
shifts in the NAIRU in the past decade.
The second section of the paper discusses the implications for demand
management of different forms of supply shocks. The major novelty in this
section is the study of the hypothesis of hysteresis, in which the NAIRU
itself rises endogenously in response to continued slack in the economy. Some
have argued that the presence of hysteresis would argue in favor of a demand-.39—
expansion, because of the secondary benefits of reducing the NAIRU over time.
In fact, the existence of hysteresis has subtle implications for demand
management. The formal model shows a case in which the optimal demand
response to a price shock is to absorb some of the price increase in the form
of a recession, even if that results in a permanent increase in the NAIRU.4O—
Footnotes




Now,let the change in a +k/be denoted by t,,andapproximate
by-9(U-Uti) for an appropriate 0.
2.The characteristic equation of (17) reduces to r(r2-or-q2a-f2—of) =0.




3.We want to show that 1 +c13
>0or c13 >-1.To do this, note that
C13 =4c12/(f+r1)and c12 =-4a/r1.Combining these expressions, we have




r1,f>0,we see that sign(1+c13) =sign[r1(f+r1)
-42a].To show that
[r1(f+r1) -q2a] < 0,we show first that r >q2a. Thisin turn implies
[r1(f-i-r1) —q2a} > 0and therefore 1 +C13 > 0.To prove r >2a, consider
again the characteristic equation of (17), in footnote 3. We see that
satisfies the equation r -Or1
- — f2-Of=0,so that
—q2a = Or1+f2+Of>0(the inequality follows from the fact that r1, ,
f>0).This iswhatwe needed to demonstrate.—41-
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